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Profit sharing generates conflicting changes in the relationship between supervisors and 
workers.  It may increase cooperation and helping effort. At the same time it can increase 
direct  monitoring  and  pressure  by  the  supervisor,  and  mutual  monitoring  and  peer 
pressure from other workers that is transmitted through the supervisor.  Using data on 
satisfaction with the boss, we initially show that workers under profit sharing tend to 
have lower satisfaction with their supervisor. Additional estimates show this is largely 
generated  by  groups  of  workers  who  would  be  least  likely  to  respond  to  increased 
supervisory pressure with increase effort: women, those with dependents and those with 
health limitations.  Despite this finding, profit sharing seems to have little or no influence 
on overall job satisfaction as the reduction in satisfaction with the boss is offset with 
increased satisfaction with earnings, a finding consistent with profit sharing enhancing 
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Profit sharing has been identified with a range of positive economic outcomes 
including increased firm productivity, innovation and profits, reduced worker turnover 
and increased worker training (Kruse 1992; Bhargava 1994; Azfar and Danninger 2001; 
Green and Heywood 2007; Harden, Kruse and Blasi 2008). Most of these outcomes have 
at their base theoretical conjectures about how profit sharing changes the relationships 
between  co-workers  and  between  workers  and  the  firm.  Without  these  changes,  the 
potential  for  increased  worker  effort  and  productivity  remains  limited  by  the  strong 
incentive for free-riding.  One view of these changes, claims profit sharing increases 
cooperation  between  colleagues  and  between  workers  and  management  in  a  repeated 
game (Weitzman and Kruse 1990, McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Pendelton 2006).  An 
alternative view  emphasizes that profit sharing generates mutual monitoring and peer 
pressure (Kandel and  Lazear 1992;  Freeman, Kruse and Blasi 2008). The role of the 
supervisor emerges as key in this second view. Profit sharing enhances both the ability 
and  the  incentive  for  supervisors  to  monitor  and  punish  workers  in  order  to  reduce 
shirking  (Heywood,  Jirjahn  and  Tsertsvadze  2005b).  Moreover,  much  of  the  mutual 
monitoring  between  co-workers  takes  place  through  the  reporting  of  shirking  to 
supervisors (Freeman, Kruse and Blasi 2008). In this second view, while profit sharing 
may  change  relationships  between  supervisors  and  workers  to  increase  effort,  the 
resulting increase in monitoring may nonetheless decrease workers' utility. 
 
We  use  the  detail  of  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey  (BHPS)  to  examine  the 
influence of profit sharing on the relationship between workers and their supervisor or 
boss. While recognizing that profit sharing has many aspects and may influence overall 
workers' utility, we are interested in the utility flowing from this relationship.  Thus, we 
focus on a specific measure of how satisfied workers are with their immediate boss.  We 
confirm  that  profit  sharing  is  associated  with  reduced  satisfaction  with  the  boss. 
Moreover  profit  sharing  is  also  associated  with  reduced  worker  emphasis  on  the 
importance of getting along with their boss. Yet, this deterioration in relations with the 
supervisor does not reflect a diminution in overall job satisfaction and is specific to the  
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relationship with the boss.  Profit sharing has a neutral or positive influence on all of the 
other available dimensions of job satisfaction.  
 
We also identify a pattern of results that support the notion that reduced satisfaction with 
the  boss  is  due  to  increased  monitoring  and  pressure  associated  with  profit  sharing.  
Women, those with children and those in poorer health appear to be more sensitive to the 
monitoring  and  pressure  associated  with  profit  sharing.  It  is  the  satisfaction  of  these 
groups with their boss that declines the most in the face of profit sharing.  If these groups 
have the least ability to respond to pressure to perform (not shirk), either because of 
inherent limitations or greater responsibilities at home, one would anticipate this greater 
drop in satisfaction. 
 
In what follows, the next section isolates the potential contradictory influences of profit 
sharing on relations with co-workers and, in more detail, with the boss.  The third section 
introduces  our  data  and  methodology  while  the  fourth  section  presents  the  critical 
estimations.  A final section concludes and makes suggestions for further research. 
 
2 PROFIT SHARING AND SUPERVISORY PRESSURE 
 
At  its core  profit  sharing  seeks  to  alleviate  agency  problems  by  more  closely 
aligning worker and firm interests. For instance, in a survey of US firms, Kruse (1993) 
reports that the most prevalent reason given by managers for providing profit sharing is to 
motivate  workers.  Yet,  this  alignment  of  interest  may  not  motivate  workers  as  each 
worker  faces  an  incentive  to  free-ride  on  the  effort  of  others.  Absent  extreme 
interdependencies in technology (Adams 2006), workers will recognize that only 1/N of 
their productivity increase will be returned to them through the profit sharing scheme and 
will under supply effort. Yet, this simple conclusion fails to recognize that profit sharing 
creates an incentive for each worker to influence the productivity of their co-workers. 
This incentive can change group norms. On the one hand, it can encourage increased co-
operation  and  helping  on-the-job  (see  the  evidence  presented  by  Drago  and  Garvey 
1998).  On the other hand, it also encourages mutual monitoring and peer pressure to  
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reduce  shirking  (Kandel  and  Lazear  1992).    While  both  of  these  may  increase 
productivity, they can have very different influences on worker utility. 
 
At first thought both helping on-the-job and mutual monitoring represent workers taking 
on  responsibilities  previously done  only  by  managers.  Certainly  the  basic  managerial 
function of monitoring effort is replaced, in part, by horizontal monitoring by co-workers. 
Workers  are  often  in  a  better  position  than  managers  to monitor  effort.    As  workers 
conduct their activities, they gain knowledge about the productivity of their co-workers 
and profit sharing creates an incentive to act on this knowledge. Much of the emphasis in 
the literature is on the creation of peer pressure with Kandel and Lazear (1992) discussing 
examples including internal pressure by guilt and external pressure by shame, ostracism 
and even physical punishment when a worker is caught shirking by his co-workers. The 
case study of Continental Airlines by Knez and Simester (2001) identify both a high 
incidence  of  mutual  monitoring  of  absence  and  of  peer  pressure  induced  by  the 
company's profit sharing plan.  More generally, survey data used by Freeman, Kruse and 
Blasi (2008) reveal that most workers can detect shirking among co-workers and that 
profit  sharing  (group  incentive)  schemes  are  associated  with  a  significantly  larger 
likelihood of taking action against those shirking by, for example, talking directly to 
them. 
 
Less clear in this story of horizontal monitoring and enforcement is the important role of 
the supervisor.  The survey data make clear that the most likely response to observing 
shirking is to report it to the supervisor (Freeman, Kruse and Blasi 2008). Profit sharing 
creates an incentive to provide information to supervisors that would otherwise be absent 
or only available at higher cost.  Moreover, not only does the supervisor have better 
information  on  worker  shirking  because  of  profit  sharing,  she  also  has  an  increased 
incentive  to  use  this  information  by  putting  pressure  on  shirkers  to  perform.    This 
incentive is at least two-fold.  First, the workers themselves have an incentive to pressure 
the supervisor to deal with shirkers.  Thus, the label 'horizontal monitoring' does not 
necessarily mean that the resulting pressure on those shirking comes directly from co-
workers.  Second, most profit sharing arrangements include the immediate supervisor  
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who, as a consequence, has a large financial incentive to pressure shirkers.  Indeed, the 
unique tools of a supervisory position suggest that the effectiveness of such pressure may 
be particularly effective.  For instance, Freeman, Kruse and Blasi (2008) show that the 
motivation to act against shirkers for the particular reason of increasing group earnings is 
greater among those higher in the firm hierarchy.  
 
Thus, profit sharing should be anticipated to result in increased monitoring and pressure 
from  the  boss.    This  reflects  the  improved  information  and  pressure  provided  by 
horizontal  monitoring  (through  the  interaction  of  the  workers  with  the  boss)  and  the 
increased financial incentive for the boss to pressure shirkers. With this anticipation, a 
critical  point  is  that  made  by  Kandel  and  Lazear  (1992,  p.  805):  "While  pressure 
guarantees higher effort, it does not guarantee higher utility because the pressure itself is 
borne by all members of the firm."  Barron and Gjerde (1997) go further arguing that 
some firms may reduce the intensity of profit sharing or eliminate it altogether because 
the  disutility  imposed  by  monitoring  and  peer  pressure  violates  the  participation 
constraint.    In  essence,  the  individually  rational  worker  engages  in  too  much  peer 
pressure  because the  disutility  that  his  or  her  peer  pressure  imposes  on  others is not 
internalised.  As much of this pressure may be channelled through the supervisor, profit 
sharing may cause workers to dislike or resent their supervisor even as it causes them to 
exert more effort. 
 
Moreover, even as profit sharing increases effort, the increased monitoring and pressure 
may crowd-out cooperation and trust within the firm (Orr 2001).  In this view profit 
sharing creates a 'suspicion effect' in which workers suspect that co-workers and the boss 
provide  effort  and  help  not  for  intrinsic  reasons  but  simply  to  avoid  monitoring  and 
pressure.  This may reduce the utility that the workers receive from their relationships 
with their boss. 
 
We recognize that profit sharing changes many dimensions of employment and certainly 
do not suggest they will all be negative.  Again, the net influence of profit sharing may be 
to increase utility but our primary interest is the utility derived from the relationship  
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between workers and their boss.  Even here profit sharing may have positive influences.  
Drago  and  Turnbull  (1988)  demonstrate  that  profit  sharing  provides  incentives  for 
helping on-the-job since each worker's income depends, in part, on the output of co-
workers.  Indeed,  empirical  work  by  Drago  and  Garvey  (1998)  shows  an  increased 
willingness of workers to share tools under profit sharing.  Moreover, Rotenberg (1994) 
emphasises the close connection between such cooperation and the utility one gets from 
interacting with co-workers.  Similar, reasoning applies to relations with the supervisors. 
Profit  sharing  may  lead  to  more  helping  of  workers  by  the  supervisor,  improved 
relationships and higher utility.  In this view cooperation may be beneficial and add to 
utility regardless of the motivation. 
 
Profit sharing may also influence how fairly supervisors treat workers. Prendergast and 
Topel (1993) argue that favouritism is more likely when supervisors are not the residual 
claimants of workers’ outputs. Laffront (1990) shows that the supervisor’s incentive to 
engage in hidden gaming and favouritism is reduced if the supervisor receives a profit 
share. These results follow from the observation that if a supervisor’s remuneration is 
dependent on worker output this increases the cost of `incorrectly’ rewarding relatively 
poor performing subordinates.  Insofar as favouritism and other unfair treatment increases 
conflict, it would be expected that profit sharing should increase worker satisfaction with 
their superiors.  
 
Overall, theory provides an ambiguous answer to how profit sharing should influence the 
satisfaction  of  workers  with  their  supervisors.  The  few  studies  that  have  directly 
examined this provide little consensus either.  As part of a more general study of the 
relationship between job satisfaction and performance pay, Heywood and Wei (2006) 
present a single specification on the only year, 1988, that the NLSY includes both a 
measure of satisfaction with the supervisor and the provision of profit sharing.  They find 
a  small  and  weakly  significant  increase in  satisfaction  associated  with  profit  sharing.  
Importantly, this positive relationship appears as part of a broader relationship in which 
those in profit sharing tend to have higher overall satisfaction as well.  Heywood, Jirjahn 
and Tsertsvadze (2005b) examine a single year of the GSOEP, 1995, that asks about the  
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degree of conflict with the boss. Profit sharing reduced the degree of conflict for male 
workers who were in good health and had no supervisory responsibilities.  For others, the 
influence was often absent or even negative.  Kruse, Freeman and Blasi (2008) probe 
individual  elements  of  work  life  showing  that  "shared  capitalism"  is  associated  with 
worker perceptions of being treated with respect, of promotions being handled fairly and 
of management-employee relations being good.  Profit sharing, in particular, is strongly 
associated with perceptions that the company is fair to employees. Yet, the link between 
overall job satisfaction and profit sharing emerged as insignificant in one data source and 
as having offsetting influences in the second data source.
1 This may not be surprising as 
in  their  review  of  12  studies  examining  the  influence  of  various  forms  of  employee 
ownership on job satisfaction, Kruse, Freeman and Blasi (2008 p. 7) conclude that there 
exists "no clear generalization." Certainly, recent studies of profit sharing per se (Green 
and  Heywood  2008;  Artz  2008)  do  not  change  this  conclusion.    In  short,  the  issue 
deserves additional empirical inquiry. 
 
2.1 Workers for whom increased supervisory pressure is more likely 
 
Workers differ in their ability to increase their  effort and productivity in response to 
incentives. This point becomes critical in thinking about the behaviour of supervisors 
under profit sharing. Workers who are less able to increase their effort as a result of 
increased pressure may find themselves singled out by co-workers and supervisors. In our 
estimations, we focus on a number of specific groups for whom it may be expected that 
this could be true. Thus, in addition to asking the general question of whether or not 
profit sharing influences the job satisfaction associated with the supervisor, we examine 
circumstances in which a negative influence might be particularly likely. 
 
Women  may  demand  greater  flexibility  between  work  and  home  due  to  greater 
responsibility of household production. This leads them to be sorted (or sort) into jobs 
with lesser degrees of interdependent worker productivity (Goldin 1986; Heywood and  
                                                 
1 Using the NBER data, profit sharing provision was associated with lower job satisfaction even as the 
share of earnings derived from profit sharing was associated with higher job satisfaction.  
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Wei, 1997). Insofar as this is linked to lower workplace effort (Heywood and Jirjahn 
2004)  and  less  responsiveness  of  effort  to  group  incentives,  this  may lead  to  greater 
supervisory  pressure  on  women  in  a  profit  sharing  environment.  In  turn,  this  makes 
women  more  likely  to  report  that  profit  sharing  reduces  their  satisfaction  with  the 
supervisor. This influence may be exacerbated further for women who have dependent 
children. These workers may be particularly less able to respond to pressure because they 
have even greater home responsibilities.   
 
Those  in  poor  health  may  also  be  less  able  to  respond  to  pressure.  Inherently  low 
productivity workers will be the least able to respond to the incentives provided by profit 
sharing and will be worse off as peer pressure is applied.  It may also be the case that low 
productivity workers are the least likely to be the beneficiaries of helping effort as they 
are the least likely to reciprocate.  While we anticipate that indicators of low productivity 
may be associated with conflict in any workplace, these indicators will be associated with 
even more conflict in the face of profit sharing.  It is these workers who will be reported 
to the supervisor as not carrying their weight and as worthy of pressure and punishment. 
Thus, the information that enhances the ability to detect and punish low productivity will 
generate greater conflict between lower productivity workers and their supervisor. 
 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The  data  in  this  paper  are  drawn  from  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey  (BHPS), 
which has run from 1991 onwards. The BHPS is a nationally representative sample that 
each year interviews approximately 10,000 individuals from roughly 5,500 households 
across Great Britain. The BHPS contains a number of variables related to job satisfaction 
and we are specifically interested in attitudes towards the boss. The related variable how 
satisfied are you with the boss is available only from 1991-1997. All job satisfaction 
questions in the BHPS are reported on a 7 value Likert scale, 1 being the least satisfied, 7 
the most satisfied. We restrict our sample to those individuals aged 20 to 65 and exclude 




Over the years the BHPS has contained different information on payment methods but for 
1991-1997 participants were asked the question "did you receive a profit share or bonus" 
which we use as our indicator of profit share receipt.  As recognized by others (Booth and 
Frank 1999), for the years 1992-1994 this question was only asked for individuals who 
changed  jobs.  In  the  our  empirical  analysis  we  estimate  all  models  for  the  complete 
sample, 1991-1997, assuming that if the worker did not change jobs their profit sharing 
status did not change. While others have made this assumption (Lemieux, MacLeod and 
Parent 2007), we recognize that it generates an errors-in-variables problem potentially 
biasing  our  estimates  toward  insignificance.    An  alternative  approach  used  only  the 
observations  that  provide  a  current  year  indicator  of  profit  sharing.  This  alternative 
becomes more important if there exist substantial changes in the use of profit sharing for 
workers who retain the same job.
2  Importantly, all of our key results except one remain 
identical across these alternative treatments of the data difficulty. We highlight this one 
difference when discussing the results. 
 
Table A1 presents summary statistics split by whether the worker receives profit sharing 
or not.  Briefly, women are less likely to be employed under profit sharing arrangements, 
as are workers with dependent children. Workers under profit sharing relationships, on 
average, work longer hours, both in terms of normal hours and overtime. They also have 
higher average education levels and are less likely to have poor/fair health.  
 
        INSERT TABLE 1 
   
Table 1 provides preliminary evidence of a link between profit shares and attitudes to the 
boss. It reports sample means for satisfaction with the boss split according to whether the 
worker received a profit share or not. For the purposes of comparison we also report 
overall job satisfaction, as well as the two other dimensions available in the BHPS for 
                                                 
2 Indeed, in his examination of profit sharing in Germany, Jirjahn (2002) found that between 1994 and 1996 
more establishments either added or dropped profit sharing than retained it over the two-year period.  
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this period, satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with hours. Workers on profit shares 
report a significantly (at 1%) lower average satisfaction with the boss than other workers. 
In terms of more general differences, there is no statistically significant difference in 
average overall job satisfaction between profit share workers and other workers. Workers 
on profit sharing arrangements report significantly (at 1%) higher satisfaction with pay 
and lower satisfaction with hours.   At issue is whether or not these patterns persist after 
accounting  for  reasonable  controls.    Moreover,  we  will  examine  whether  or  not  the 
pattern of results supports differences by demographic groups that may be more or less 




We now seek to examine the relationship between satisfaction with the boss and 
profit sharing arrangements in a multivariate setting. Following past research, the values 
of  satisfaction  with  the  boss  are  fitted  to  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  through 
ordered probit estimates (see Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Clark 1997 among others). 
Estimation by ordered probit follows appropriately when the dependent variable has a 
natural ordering, such as least to most satisfied (see McKelvey and Zavonia 1975). 
 
          INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 2 provides basic estimates of the association between profit sharing arrangements 
and satisfaction with the boss. Three models are reported, the first (I) includes controls 
for basic personal characteristics, the second (II) adds controls for industry, occupation 
and tenure and the third (III) adds controls for hours worked (regular and overtime) and 
for supervisory and/or managerial roles. For model (I) men are less satisfied with their 
boss perhaps reflecting the general tendency for women to me more satisfied with most 
aspects of employment (see Clark 1997).  Age appears to have the U-shape identified in 
many job satisfaction studies (Clark et al. 1996) and marital status is generally a positive 
determinant while education is a negative determinant both common results in general 
studies of job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996). Of central importance, profit sharing  
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is associated with a statistically significant negative reduction in satisfaction with the 
boss. This relationship remains essentially unchanged once extra controls (models II and 
III) are included. Several of those added controls emerge as important yet they do not 
displace  the  role  of  profit  sharing.  Hence,  there  is  initial  evidence  of  a  negative 
relationship between profit shares and satisfaction with the boss that is not explained by 
standard personal and workplace characteristics.  
 
 We further investigate this negative association between profit sharing and relations with 
the boss using information on what workers consider the most important aspects of a job. 
The first wave of the BHPS (1991) records what workers consider the first and second 
most important aspect of a job. Possible responses include pay, promotion prospects, job 
security, the actual work itself, use of initiative or hours worked. Another category of 
response is “good relations with the manager”. We use this response to create a binary 
variable taking the value of unity if the individual responded that good relations with the 
manager is among the first or second most important aspect of a job. This becomes an 
alternative  dependent  variable  in  a  model  with  the  same  covariates  as  (III)  above. 
Marginal effects from probit estimation of this equation are reported in column 4 of Table 
2. These demonstrate that workers under profit shares are 8 percentage points less likely 
to list good relations with the manager as an important aspect of the job. We do not know 
to what extent this reflects the sorting of workers with certain attitudes into profit sharing, 
or  a  conditioning  result  of  the  working  environment  under  profit  sharing  on  worker 
attitudes. Yet, either way, it remains suggestive of a negative association between profit 
sharing and the quality of relations with the boss.  
 
        INSERT TABLE 3 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  estimates  of  profit  sharing’s  negative  effect  on 
satisfaction with the boss do not merely reflect an effect on overall job satisfaction. To 
demonstrate  this  we  re-estimate  (III)  with  overall  job  satisfaction  as  the  dependent 
variable. Estimates, reported in column 1 of Table 3, suggest that there is no relationship  
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between  profit  sharing  and  overall  job  satisfaction.
3  Table  3  also  reports  analogous 
estimates  of  the  relationship  between  profit  shares  and  satisfaction  with  hours,  and 
satisfaction with pay, respectively. Again there is no evidence of a relationship between 
profit shares and satisfaction with working hours. There is, however, evidence that profit 
sharing  is  associated  with  higher  satisfaction  with  pay.  This,  when  coupled  with  the 
negative impact of profit shares on satisfaction with the boss, highlight the potential for a 
trade-off  between  higher  productivity  (and  hence  improved  pay)  and  increased 
supervisory pressure under profit sharing.  Thus, it seems consistent that profit sharing 
brings  additional  peer  and  supervisory  monitoring  that  increases  productivity  and 
earnings but which workers do not like as reflected in relations with their supervisor.   
 
We obviously see this evidence as somewhat at odds with the US evidence from Kruse, 
Freeman and Blasi (2008) that workers in "shared capitalism" are more likely to see their 
boss as caring and helpful and less likely to report being closely supervised.  We note that 
the US results emerge more strongly when focusing on employee ownership and less 
strongly when focusing on profit sharing.  We also note the large differences in scope 
between our broad measure of job satisfaction with the boss and the more detailed aspects 
examined in the US surveys.  Nonetheless, the marked differences suggest the need to 
break down our results to search for patterns that could be consistent with a role for 
supervisory pressure.  In short, supervisory pressure may not be applied equally to all 
workers. 
 
4.1 Moderating Influences   
 
As outlined in section 2.1, workers differ in their ability to alter their effort in response to 
the pressure created by peer and, ultimately, by supervisory pressure. To the extent that 
our initial findings suggest such pressure may have negative influences on satisfaction 
with the boss, these pressures may be intensified or moderated for certain groups based  
 
                                                 
3 Using later waves of the BHPS (1998-2004), Green and Heywood (2008) demonstrate a positive 
relationship between profit sharing and overall job satisfaction while Artz (2008) shows an insignificant  
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on  their  ability  to  respond.  Here,  we  focus  on  two,  not  mutually  exclusive,  groups, 
females and workers with health problems. In general, women face more complicated 
labour supply and effort decisions because of a greater average emphasis on household 
production. In so far as this implies a higher opportunity cost of work effort, women may 
be less responsive to the supervisory pressure to increase effort that may come with profit 
sharing. In work examining getting along with colleagues using the GSOEP, Heywood, 
Jirjahn  and  Tsertsvadze  (2005a)  found  that  while  men  reported  that  profit  sharing 
improved their relations with co-workers, women did not. They speculated that this may 
reflect a difference in the ability of the genders to respond to peer pressure. To see if such 
differences exist in relations with the boss, we allow the impact of profit sharing on 
satisfaction with the boss to vary by gender. We then focus more specifically on the role 
of household responsibilities by allowing the effect of profit sharing to vary by whether 
or not the worker has dependent children. 
 
          INSERT TABLE 4 
 
 
The first column of Table 4 presents an estimate of model (III) with an interaction term 
between profit sharing and gender. The estimates reveal marked gender differences in the 
effect  of profit  sharing  on satisfaction  with  the  boss  that are  suggestive  of  increased 
supervisory pressure for female workers. The overall negative effect of profit sharing on 
satisfaction with the boss continues but the male interaction is positive and significant.  
Indeed, examining the sum of the coefficients for the original profit sharing variable and 
for the interaction, one cannot reject the hypothesis that profit sharing has no influence on 
the satisfaction of men with their boss.  On the other hand allowing for this interaction 
reveals an even larger negative coefficient for women than was evident in the earlier 
estimations. This estimation suggests that it is women who report that profit sharing is 
associated  with  reduced  satisfaction  with  the  boss.    Indeed,  separate  (unreported) 
estimates by gender confirm a large significant decline in satisfaction for women.  This 
decline is not duplicated in an otherwise similar estimate for men. 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between profit sharing and overall satisfaction using the Britain at Work survey.  
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We seek to further examine the potential role of household responsibilities further by 
allowing the effect of profit sharing to also vary by whether the worker has a dependent 
child.   Column 2 reports estimates that include an interaction term indicating whether or 
not  the  worker  has  a  dependent  child  and  who  receive  a  profit  share.  Whilst  this 
interaction term is associated with lower satisfaction with the boss, it is not statistically 
significant.
4 Both the overall effect of profit shares on satisfaction with the boss, and the 
interaction effect of male and profit share remain negative and statistically significant. 
 
These estimates generate somewhat different results when restricted to observations for 
which we have a current year observation on profit sharing.  Thus, whilst previously we 
have  not  shown  the  results  from  the  restricted  sample  (as  they  were  essentially 
unchanged), we now add them to the third and fourth columns of Table 5.  The third 
column shows the consequences of adding the interaction of gender with profit sharing.  
The pattern of coefficients looks very similar to that reported for the full sample and the 
interaction again indicates that it is women who report lower satisfaction with their boss 
in the face of profit sharing.  The difference emerges when adding the interaction with 
dependent child in the final column.  The male interaction continues to take a positive 
coefficient but is no longer significant.  Nonetheless it is large enough that one continues 
to  be  unable  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  profit  sharing  has  no  influence  on  the 
satisfaction of men with their boss. Having a dependent child and receiving profit sharing 
is associated with lower satisfaction with the boss Thus, these results indicate that both 
women workers and workers with dependent children report lower satisfaction with their 
boss. Moreover, the decrement associated with being a female with a dependent child is 
now  the  sum  of  two  large  significant  and  negative  coefficients.  That  women  with 
dependent children see the greatest loss of satisfaction under profit sharing is presumably 
related to their greater household production responsibilities and is suggestive of their 
greater difficulty in responding to supervisory pressure to increase effort.   
 
                                                 
4 Similar estimates result if either number of children or worker is primarily responsible for childcare are 
included and interacted with profit shares instead of the worker has a dependent child.   
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        INSERT TABLE 5 
 
 
We now examine workers with health problems. Again, this group of workers is likely to 
face a higher cost of effort and hence may be less responsive to the monitoring  and 
pressure  associated  with  profit  sharing.  The  BHPS  has  a  number  of  self-reported 
measures of respondents’ health. We focus on two components that appear most likely to 
be related to work effort. First, respondents are asked to classify their health over the last 
12 months as being good, fair or poor. On the basis of this we assign each worker to 
either not in good health, or in good health (the latter is used as the omitted category). 
Second, respondents are also asked if their health limits the type of work they perform 
and/or if it limits the amount of work they perform.  Thus, in total, we examine three 
measures of worker health. 
   
Table 5 provides estimates of the relationship between workers’ health, profit sharing and 
satisfaction with the boss. Again we use model (III) as the basis for these additional 
estimates. Column 1 reports estimates where a control for the worker’s health is included. 
While workers who are not in good health have lower satisfaction with the boss, the 
effect of profit sharing on satisfaction with the boss is essentially unchanged. The next 
column reports estimates where an interaction between health and profit sharing is also 
included. While the sign of this interaction is indicative of lower satisfaction with the 
boss  for  workers  in  poor  health  receiving  profit  shares,  this  effect  is  not  statistically 
significant.   
   
The effect of health is examined in more detail by assessing particular types of work 
limitations caused by poor health. Column 3 reports estimates where separate controls 
indicating that the worker’s health limits their amount of work or it limits their type of 
work are included. The former may be of particular interest here as it seems a direct 
indicator  of  the  difficulties  in  increasing  effort.  The  estimates  reveal  no  statistically 
significant relationship between limits on the type of work and satisfaction with the boss.   
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There is some indication that those workers for whom their health limits their amount of 
work have lower satisfaction with the boss, but this is not statistically significant. The 
next column includes interactions between these two variables and profit sharing. These 
estimates suggest that workers who are limited by their health in how much they can 
work and who receive profit sharing have significantly lower satisfaction with their boss. 
Thus, at least one of the health variables provides strong support for the notion that those 
physically less able to respond to pressure for increased effort have a stronger negative 
reaction to profit sharing.    
 
In total both the demographic and health results fit a pattern in which profit sharing 
drives demands for greater productivity and effort.  Relations with the supervisor seem a 
likely point for these demands and the conflict associated with them to be focused.  Not 
only is there an initial suggestion that workers on profit sharing have less satisfaction 
with their supervisor but the disaggregate pattern seems to fit the general story.  Those 
groups  that  we  anticipate  can  less  easily  respond  to  supervisory  pressure  are  those 




The  method  through  which  profit  sharing  influences  productivity  and  effort 
remains in doubt. Two broad strands of not-mutually exclusive thought emphasize that 
the  direct incentive  effect  is  low  but  that  profit  sharing  changes  relationships  among 
workers and between workers and the firm.  Profit sharing may increase cooperation and 
helping effort.  It may also increase monitoring and pressure. We have emphasized that 
much of either influence will flow through the supervisor.  As a consequence, the way in 
which profit sharing changes relations between workers and supervisor helps identify 
which influence may be predominant.  
 
Our initial evidence shows that those on profit sharing in the UK report lower satisfaction 
with their boss.  This is collaborated by findings that they also report good relations with 
the boss as a less important job characteristic.  Nonetheless, this finding does not reflect  
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workers  on profit  sharing  reporting  lower  levels  of  overall  satisfaction.   Importantly, 
there appear to be specific groups of workers that generate much of this overall finding.  
Women,  those  with  children  and  those  with  health  limitations  are  the  workers  that 
generate the association of profit sharing with a lower level of satisfaction with the boss.  
We have suggested these groups may be those for whom supervisory pressure can less 
easily be translated into greater effort and who may, therefore, have greater resentment 
toward their supervisor. 
 
We recognize that neither profit sharing nor the existing workforce exogenously appear 
in a workplace.  It is possible that worker selection or firm selection may be generating 
our  results.  Using  an  individual  data  source  provides  us  few  reasonable  instruments.  
Nonetheless,  we  emphasize  that  our  core  results  are  not  of  the  sort  that  typically 
generates selection concerns.  Had we found that workers in profit sharing  are more 
satisfied, one might anticipate that they had selected into workplaces with profit sharing 
in place.  Instead, we have found a tendency toward less satisfaction with the supervisor 
among those receiving profit sharing.  Nonetheless, we highlight that issues of selection 
stand  as  reasonable  future  research  especially  for  those  using  matched  employee-
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TABLE 1, SATISFACTION BY PAYMENT TYPE 
 











Profit Share/Bonus  5.403  5.534  4.726  5.116 
No Profit Share/Bonus  5.454  5.663  4.560  5.274 
Observations  18240       
Source: BHPS  
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TABLE 2 Profit Sharing and Satisfaction with the Boss 
BHPS 1991-97, Private Sector Non-Union Employees 20-65 years old. 
 







Getting Along with 
Boss Important  





























































































































Log Likelihood  -28311.276  -28228.934  -27875.294  -1292.3803 
Observations  18240  18240  18240  2475 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. Models I-III include controls for year.  
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TABLE 3 Profit Shares and Overall Job Satisfaction. 
BHPS 1991 – 1997, Private Sector Non-Union Employees 20-65 years old 
 
  Model (III) 






























Log Likelihood  -28106.298  -30276.170  -32966.189 
Observations  18329  18337  18313 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively.  
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TABLE 4 Profit Shares and Satisfaction with the Boss, The Role of Gender, Kids and 
Hours Worked. BHPS 1991 – 1997, Private Sector Non-Union Employees 20-65 years 
old 
 
  All Observations  Restricted Sample 










































Dependent Child * 
Profit Share 
 
  -0.045 
[0.068] 
  -0.131*** 
[0.075] 


























Log Likelihood  -27844.233  -27843.940  -18077.998  -18076.254 
Observations  17996    11739   
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 




TABLE 5 Worker Health, Profit Shares and Satisfaction with the Boss:  
BHPS 1991 – 1997, Private Sector Non-Union Employees 20-65 years old. 
 
  (III) + 
Health 
Control 




Does this vary by 
PS? 
















Not in Good Health 
* Profit Share 
 
  -0.009 
[0.049] 
   
Health Limits: 
Amount of Work 
 





Type of Work 




Amount of Work * 
Profit Share 
      -0.272*** 
[0.158] 
Type of Work *  
Profit Share 
 
      0.260 
[0.173] 
























Log Likelihood  -27810.999  -27810.974  -27807.039  -27805.323 
Observations  17996       
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 




TABLE A1 Sample Statistics 1991-1997, Private Sector Non-Union Employees 
 
 
  No Profit 
Share 
Profit Share 
Male  0.473  0.604 
Age   37.810  36.242 
Married   0.610  0.603 
Dependant Child  0.168  0.095 
Poor/Fair Health  0.217  0.186 
< High School Completion  0.679  0.588 
High School Completion  0.171  0.213 
Diploma  0.056  0.067 
Degree  0.081  0.112 
Higher Degree  0.013  0.020 
Tenure (years)  10.543  10.651 
Normal Hours   33.742  37.173 
Overtime Hours  3.836  4.932 
Foreman/Supervisor  0.165  0.163 
Manager  0.157  0.276 
Observations  11706  6290 
Source: BHPS 
 